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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1085 
____________ 
 
DOUGLAS M. HODCZAK; JAMES M. CROSSAN; 
THOMAS J. MAGDIC; and JOSEPH A. LITVIK, 
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, 
    Appellants 
 
v. 
 
LATROBE SPECIALTY STEEL COMPANY 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-08-cv-00649) 
District Judge:  Honorable Terrence F. McVerry 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 25, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 17, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Douglas Hodczak, James Crossan, Thomas Magdic, and Joseph Litvik 
(collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from an order of the District Court granting Latrobe 
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Specialty Steel Company’s (“LSS”) motion for summary judgment.  For the reasons 
stated below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 Appellants were all hired by one of LSS’s predecessors, Latrobe Steel Company, 
between 1969 and 1979.  In 2006, Watermill Group and Hicks Holdings acquired the 
company and renamed it Latrobe Specialty Steel.  At the time of the acquisition, 
Appellants initially chose to retire, but were subsequently offered and accepted 
employment with LSS. 
 In October 2007, during the course of an investigation into a sexual harassment 
complaint against Magdic, LSS discovered that Appellants, as well as two other 
employees, Thomas Everett and David Conrad, regularly exchanged emails containing 
sexually explicit photographs.  LSS’s Electronic Communications Policy (“EC Policy”) 
expressly prohibits employees from sending such materials.  As such, LSS executives 
decided to preliminarily suspend all six employees pending further inquiry.  In deciding 
the appropriate level of discipline for each employee, LSS considered the nature and 
volume of the emails exchanged, whether they were sent to individuals inside or outside 
the company, and whether they were sent to customers or vendors.  Approximately one 
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week after they were suspended, Appellants were informed that their employment was 
being terminated.  Neither Everett nor Conrad was terminated.  At the time they were 
fired, Appellants were all in their late fifties or early sixties. 
 Appellants subsequently filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, alleging that LSS discriminated against them because of their 
age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 621 et seq.  On December 29, 2010, the District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of LSS, concluding that Appellants had failed to demonstrate that “but for” their 
ages, LSS would not have terminated their employment. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We exercise appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment de novo, and apply “the same standard that guides our district 
courts.”  Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation 
omitted).  Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)). 
III. 
 We must analyze Appellants’ ADEA claims under the burden-shifting framework 
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Keller v. Orix 
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Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997).  Under McDonnell Douglas, 
the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under 
the ADEA.  Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009).  This requires 
proof that:  (1) the plaintiff was a member of the protected age class; (2) he suffered an 
adverse employment decision; (3) he was qualified to hold the position; and (4) he was 
replaced by a significantly younger employee.  Id.  With the exception of Hodczak, LSS 
concedes that Appellants have established a prima facie case of discrimination.  If the 
plaintiff meets this burden, “the burden of production shifts to the employer to identify a 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”  Id. at 690 
(citation omitted).  Here, LSS asserts that its decision to terminate Appellants’ 
employment was based on their violation of the EC Policy.  Because this justification is 
not discriminatory on its face, the burden of production shifts back to Appellants “to 
demonstrate that the employer’s proffered rationale was a pretext for age discrimination.”  
Id. (citation omitted).  “Throughout this burden-shifting exercise, the burden of 
persuasion, including the burden of proving but for causation . . . remains on the 
employee.”  Id. at 691 (internal marks and citations omitted). 
 A plaintiff can show that the employer’s proffered justification was pretextual, and 
thus that age discrimination was the but-for cause of the adverse employment decision, 
by establishing that the employer “previously discriminated against her, that the employer 
has discriminated against other persons within the plaintiff’s protected class or within 
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another protected class, or that the employer has treated more favorably similarly situated 
persons not within the protected class.”  Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 645 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994)).  In conducting 
our inquiry, we do not look at each incident in isolation; rather, we examine the “overall 
[employment] scenario.”  Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).  In this case, when we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Appellants, we do not believe that a reasonable jury could find that 
Appellants would not have been fired but for their ages.  Given the conduct in which 
Appellants engaged and the lack of sufficient evidence suggesting an atmosphere of age 
discrimination at LSS, there is no basis for a finding that LSS’s proffered rationale was a 
pretext for age discrimination.  See Simpson, 142 F.3d at 645. 
 Appellants first contend that they are able to demonstrate pretext because LSS 
discriminated against them in the past.  They allege that the following incidents are 
representative of a corporate culture of age bias at LSS:  (1) after asking Magdic if he 
was ready to retire, LSS’s CEO Hans Sack said, “it looks like you are ready to retire.  
You have gray hair and are fat”; (2) Crossan was transferred to a different position 
because LSS wanted “new blood” in the department; (3) at a 2007 management meeting, 
Sack mentioned the need to recruit a “younger workforce”; (4) older supervisors sat at 
one end of the table during meetings and were routinely interrupted when they tried to 
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speak while Dan Hennessy, LSS’s Vice President of Manufacturing, welcomed the 
advice of younger employees. 
When considering whether remarks are probative of discrimination, we consider 
the speaker’s position in the organization, the content and purpose of the statement, and 
the “temporal connection between the statement and the challenged employment action.”  
Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1997).  Here, although 
several of the statements were made by LSS executives, they were temporally remote 
from the decision to discharge Appellants, and completely unrelated to the investigation 
regarding Appellants’ violation of the EC Policy.  Thus, the comments qualify as “stray 
remarks” and are entitled to minimal weight.  See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-
Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992).  Appellants’ argument regarding seating at 
meetings rings hollow because, as they admit, they chose their seats.  Moreover, the fact 
that LSS decided to look outside the company to fill a vacancy, rather than promote from 
within, is not evidence of age discrimination.  See Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108-09 (“The 
question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it 
is whether the real reason is discrimination.” (internal marks and citation omitted)).  We 
thus agree with the District Court that Appellants’ proffered evidence of LSS’s past 
discrimination lacks serious probative value. 
 We similarly concur with the District Court’s assessment of the comparator 
evidence offered by Appellants.  It is well established that a plaintiff alleging 
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employment discrimination may establish pretext by showing “that the employer treated 
other, similarly situated persons not of his protected class more favorably.”  Fuentes, 32 
F.3d at 765.  Here, however, the persons identified by Appellants are not similarly 
situated.  Carl Dorsch is not similarly situated to Appellants because, although he 
accessed pornographic websites on his work computer, he was a non-supervisory 
employee and he did not send the content to anyone else.  Likewise, Robert Smith is not 
similarly situated to Appellants because there is no evidence that Smith actually sent 
sexually explicit emails.  Finally, although he was also suspended for violating the EC 
Policy, Conrad is not similarly situated to Appellants because he sent only one email and 
did so from his personal computer.  In contrast, Appellants exchanged sexually explicit 
emails on nearly a daily basis.  Thus, the fact that these employees, who were all younger 
than Appellants, were not immediately fired, does not establish pretext.  It is also worth 
noting that Everett, who was older than Appellants, violated the EC Policy, but his 
employment was not terminated. 
 We do not find any of Appellants’ other arguments persuasive.  The fact that the 
EC Policy was not in effect when some of the emails were sent is irrelevant; Appellants 
cannot seriously contend that they thought it was acceptable to send sexually explicit 
emails simply because there was no policy expressly prohibiting it.  Furthermore, there is 
no evidence in the record to support Appellants’ contention that LSS’s investigation of 
the sexual harassment complaint against Magdic was a “sham.”  Appellants also offer the 
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misleading argument that sending sexually explicit emails was so commonplace at LSS 
that it could not have been the real reason for their termination.  As the District Court 
explained, although 90 percent of email boxes searched during discovery included an 
email that contained a keyword search term, most of the emails identified were “false 
hits.”  In reality, only a small percentage of the emails searched contained sexually 
explicit materials.  Finally, we reject Appellants’ argument that the District Court 
improperly resolved inconsistencies in the record in favor of LSS.  To the extent that 
inconsistencies actually existed, they were largely immaterial. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
